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The title of Samuel Beckett's thirteen minimalist prose texts from 1954,
Texts for Nothing
1
, contrasts strongly with the award of the Nobel Prize for literature and the canonization of the author in 1969. This prestigious recognition can clearly be regarded as a public act of Beckettian irony, as hardly any other author has done more to refute ideas of canonicity and to undermine the foundations of the institution of literature -not to mention principal philosophical positions. Beckett's failure to appear at the ceremonial event seems symbolic of the many elsewheres of his idiosyncratic imagination and the uncanny resistance in his texts to the demands of aesthetics and the claims of logics, to whose reconstructions his diversity of textual experimentalism has contributed so forcefully.
In retrospect it seems that Beckett's oeuvre confirms the questionable truism that to negate violently the tradition within which one writes, is the best guarantee for being included and elevated to a prominent position within that very tradition. Beckett's international acclaim is well deserved, but as always, processes of canonization and celebration threaten to surrender any author's subversive writing to processes of conservation. One consequence of the canonic calcification of the continuous productivity of Beckett's writing is to apprehend his protean aesthetics within the major modes of modernism.
However illuminating such interpretations are, they passively deliver the significance of Beckett's texts into preconceived modes of hermeneutics -however current these were, or may be. A second, reductive result of these valorizations is their tendency to ignore how Beckett's texts contributed to establish the modernist criteria by which his writing has been explained. A third limitation is their lack of recognition of the aspects of Beckett's writing that suggest critical insights beyond the perspectives of paradigmatic modernism. Despite the stifling canonical status, Beckett's texts remain productive to intellectual activity.
"Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning. I, say I." 2 These are the unhinging meditations of the multicorporal narrator at the very beginning of The Unnamable, which capture in their questioning and self-reference the probing of unknowability, and the precariousness of identity and language in Beckett's texts. Clearly, the solipsistic questions do not only delve into the uncertainty of human existence; they also interrogate conventional narrativity and the functions of language. Both of these aspects -the questioning of life and lines -indicate the position of Beckett's texts as transitional in the cognitive and aesthetic shifts in the many conflicting and conflating orientations of modernism and postmodernism. Possibly no other author of the twentieth century, perhaps not even James Joyce, offers a type of writing that bolsters more resistance to interpretation, and thereby spurns continuously new modes of critical analysis.
3 New theoretical approaches tend to provide modes of thinking to which any text can be submitted, but Beckett's writing -both his creative and critical idiom -seems to anticipate, activate and abnegate its concomitant hermeneutics to an exceptional degree.
In relation to the questions of the interaction of Beckett's texts with their critical interpretations, this article aims at to principal points: The first section discusses the position of Beckett as a transitional figure in the discourses modernism and postmodernism in close relation to his own creative and critical idiom. The second section makes a point of presenting an analysis of Texts for Nothing as textual sites in which the discourses of modernism and postmodernism overlap. Astonishingly, Texts for Nothing are utterly ignored in the vast body of Beckett criticism. For the sake of discussing this major shift in the theoretical approaches to Beckett's writing, modernism and postmodernism will be simplistically defined, as they frequently are, as the dominant contours of aesthetic, critical and philosophical thinking at the beginning and the ending of the twentieth century. This facile periodisation avoids Lyotard's more conceptual and transhistorical definition of the two malleable labels. 4 Nevertheless, the two terms do not designate two distinct and totalizing approaches to Beckett's texts.
Both modernism and postmodernism are evoked as common denominators for a multiplicity of interpretations and theoretical discourses that frequently overlap and interact, as much as they diverge and counteract. Furthermore, the absurdity after post-structuralist theories of consigning a vast collection of variegated texts to the singular name of Beckett will just have to be accepted for the sake of fluent argumentation.
In Beckett's breaches of the creative and the critical, the textual and the theoretical, "Crrritic" appears as the absolutely most abomina- Suddenly, no, at last, long last, I couldn't any more, I couldn't go on. Someone said, You can't stay here. I couldn't stay here and I couldn't go. I'll describe the place, that's unimportant. The top, very flat, of a mountain, no, a hill, but so wild, enough. Quag, heath up to the knees, faint sheeptracks, troughs scooped deep by the rains. It was far down in one of these I was lying, out of the wind. Glorious prospect, but for the mist that blotted out everything, valleys, loughs, plain and sea. How can I go on, I shouldn't have begun, no, I had to begin. Someone said, perhaps the same, What possessed you to come? I could have stayed in my den, snug and dry, I couldn't. My den, I'll describe it, no, I can't. It's simple, I can do nothing any more, that's what you think. I say to the body, Up with you now, and I can feel it struggling, like an old hack foundered in the street, struggling no more, struggling again, till it gives up. I say to the head, Leave it alone, stay quiet, it stops breathing, then pants on worse than ever. I am far from all that wrangle, I shouldn't bother with it, I need nothing, neither to go on nor to stay where I am, it's truly all one tome, I should turn away from it all, away from the body, away from the head, let them work it out between them, let them cease, I can't it's I would have to cease. Ah yes, we seem to be more than one, all deaf, not even, gathered together for life.
32
These initial lines that echo the unforgettable final words of The Unnamable in The Trilogy -"you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on" -introduce a range of thematic concerns and stylistic characteristics that are central to Beckett's writing at large, and also to the transitions 32 Samuel Beckett, Texts for Nothing (1954. London; Calder & Boyars, 1974) , 7. All further reference to this text will be cited with page numbers in the text. A singular sense of subjectivity is simply not a possibility. In the quoted paragraph there is a difference between the speaking subject and the spoken subject -that is: the subject that speaks and the many positions and functions the subject that appears in language assumes.
These interstices between the speaking subject and the spoken subject are filled with possible selves, they reverse the subject position, and they incorporate possible others. The frantic "I" in the text is never at one or at once with subjectivity: "I say to the body," "I say to the head." Subjectivity can never be constituted on self-sameness; alterity is always integral to the development of self: "Someone said," "Someone said, perhaps the same." Plurality and differentiation inform the emerging self: "Ah yes, we seem to be more than one, all deaf, not even, gathered together for life." Perhaps the beginning of "Text IV" reveals most lucidly the complexities of the speaking subject and the spoken subject: The Kafkaesque "Text V" -"where to be is to be guilty" (26) -conducts a sentencing of the subject. The inescapability of the subject from linguistic incarceration is inscribed with existential persecution.
Within this atmosphere of accursed accusation Beckett's text dissolves the structures of the subject on trial and the metaphysics of law: "To be judge and party, witness and advocate, and he, attentive, indifferent, who sits and notes" (26). Judge, lawyer and clerk are imbricated in an economy of exchange that unsettles self-justified positions and distribution of justice. Any appeal to a higher court is also problematic, as such a dimensioned can not be ascertained. Such a possibility is not entirely denied, but can not be dissuaded from its various conceptualizations: "Perhaps someone will ask pity for my soul, I mustn't miss that, I won't be there, neither will God, and it doesn't matter we'll be represented" (28). Within the philosophy of being, this text indicts the metaphysics of identity, presence and divinity with sardonic humour.
Above all, this text dismantles the illusions of transparent representationality.
In the final failure to reconcile human identity with linguistic certainty, "Text XIII," the "I" is in jeopardy of becoming its own object, a mere response to the discourses preceding subjectivity. In a text that clearly anticipates the futile linguistic ramble for identity in the later play Not I, voice takes precedence over subjectivity:
Weaker still the weak old voice that tried in vain to make me, dying away as much as to say it's going from here to try elsewhere, or dying down, there's no telling, as much as to say it's going to cease, give up trying. And were there one day to be here, where there are no days, which is no place, born of the impossible voice the unmakeable being, and a gleam of light, still all would be silent and empty dark, as now, as soon now, when all will be ended, all said, it says, it murmurs. Several interpretations and theories have contributed to the continuous vitality of Beckett's texts. Certainly, it is the characteristic of most literary theories that they can be applied as a procrustean bed to any text, but in the case of Beckett the importance of texts to theory has more in common with Pandora's Box. The havoc they cause to ideas of referentiality, to former literary conventions, to the reader's expectations, and to ordinary logics promise the arrival of new modes of interpretation.
To conclude then, Texts for Nothing constitute documents in the history of the conceptualizations of humanism that dare think a self in the world without having recourse to undifferentiated subjectivity, to the self-justifications of uncontested language, and to the unrestricted liberalism of enlightenment ideology. In its narrathanotography Texts for Nothing present again and again textual indeterminacies and antifoundational aporetics that continuously threaten to disperse the critical approaches and textual theories they engender. In this perspective
Texts for Nothing still generate radical potentials for the intellectual activities of a future, whether these are labeled modernist, postmodernist, narrathanotography, or belong to a critical discourse yet to come.
34 Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" 160.
